Making space for criminalistics: Hans Gross and fin-de-siècle CSI  by Burney, Ian & Pemberton, Neil
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (2013) 16–25Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and
Biomedical Sciences
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /shpscMaking space for criminalistics: Hans Gross and ﬁn-de-siècle CSI
Ian Burney, Neil Pemberton
Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UKa r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Available online 1 October 2012
Keywords:
Forensic science
Crime scene investigation
Trace evidence
Hans Gross
Criminalistics
Criminology1369-8486  2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2012.09.002
E-mail addresses: ian.burney@manchester.ac.uk (I.
1 Davie (2005), Gibson (2002), Nye (1984), Pick (198
2 This is a point made by Claire Valier and, more rec
emphasis on the mind, body, and milieu (social, enviro
individual instances of crime. Valier (1998), Vyleta (20
Open accea b s t r a c t
This article explores the articulation of a novel forensic object—the ‘crime scene’—and its corresponding
expert—the investigating ofﬁcer. Through a detailed engagement with the work of the late nineteenth-
century Austrian jurist and criminalist Hans Gross, it analyses the dynamic and reﬂexive nature of this
model of ‘CSI’, emphasising the material, physical, psychological and instrumental means through which
the crime scene as a delineated space, and its investigator as a disciplined agent operating within it,
jointly came into being. It has a further, historiographic, aim: to move away from the commonplace
emphasis in histories of forensics on ﬁn-de-siècle criminology and toward its comparatively under-
explored contemporary, criminalistics. In so doing, it opens up new ways of thinking about the crime
scene as a deﬁning feature of our present-day forensic culture that recognise its historical contingency
and the complex processes at work in its creation and development.
 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical SciencesThis article has two aims. One is historical: to explore the late-
nineteenth century roots of what has become a deﬁning feature of
our present-day forensic culture—the crime scene as a distinct do-
main of investigation and analysis. We will do this through a de-
tailed engagement with one historical actor, the Austrian jurist
and magistrate Hans Gross, and one of his books, Handbuch für
untersuchungsrichter als system der kriminalistik (1893, translated
as Criminal Investigation: A Practical Handbook in 1906). The other,
with which we begin, is historiographical: to use this account of
‘Grossian’ crime scene investigation to show the value of shifting
attention away from the much studied case of ﬁn-de-siècle crimi-
nology and onto its comparatively underexplored contemporary,
criminalistics.
1. Separating criminology and criminalistics
In recent decades historians such as Neil Davie, Mary Gibson,
Robert Nye, Daniel Pick and Richard Wetzell have provided sophis-
ticated accounts of the disciplinary formation of criminology andBurney), neil.pemberton@manche
9), Wetzell (2000).
ently, Daniel Mark Vyleta, who criti
nmental) of criminals as a way of
06).
ss under CC BY license.its core object of concern, the criminal body. Criminology, in these
accounts, was shaped by modes of thinking drawn from evolution-
ary biology, anthropology and anthropometrics, interlaced with
degenerationist anxieties and fears of national decline, of which
the Italian criminologist Lombroso has been taken as its emblem-
atic practitioner.1 This scholarly interest in the congruity between
criminology and culture, between ideas about the criminal body
and those about the body social, though productive and important,
has nonetheless come at a price. It has marginalised a contempora-
neous forensic enterprise that, arguably, has greater relevance to the
historical path that forensics followed over the next century—
namely, the scientiﬁc investigation of the circumstances of a speciﬁc
crime and the identiﬁcation of a speciﬁc culprit as an end in itself
(criminalistics), rather than mapping these as data points within
one of the innumerable taxonomic subdivisions of contemporary
criminology.2
Separating criminalistics from criminology, of course, does not
deny the existence of historical and conceptual convergences be-
tween the two, but rather seeks out the fertile space that opensster.ac.uk (N. Pemberton)
cise the historiographical framing of criminology as a scholarly discipline for its over-
identifying them, rather than the development of scientiﬁc methods of investigating
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the scientiﬁc, technical and administrative underpinnings of late
nineteenth-century attempts to capture criminal identity provides
a glimpse of what this approach might yield. Sekula shows that
while the Parisian police bureaucrat Alphonse Bertillon and the
English statistician and founder of eugenics Francis Galton worked
within a shared cultural moment—and thereby engaged with a
common set of questions (the control of criminality via mastery
of the criminal body) and tools with which to achieve this (e.g.
the camera and the calliper)—they nonetheless ‘constitute two
methodological poles of the positivist attempts to deﬁne and reg-
ulate social deviance.’3 For Galton, the holy grail was unlocking
the secrets of race, inheritance and degeneration via the measure-
ment and statistical analysis of bodily characteristics; for Bertillon,
it was the use of these characteristics to link an individual body to
a record of an individual malefactor already entered into the police
ﬁles. Galton’s search led to the composite photograph, Bertillon’s
to the portrait parlé.
Simon Cole’s excellent history of criminal identiﬁcation extends
this point by showing how both Bertillion’s anthropometric system
and its ultimately more successful rival, ﬁngerprinting, were con-
ceptually and technically positioned at the cusp of the criminolog-
ical/criminalistic divide. Bertillon (son of an eminent demographer,
anthropologist and Quetelet disciple; police clerk in the eye of
France’s recidivist storm) devised his system to solve the problem
of individual identity, but did so in answer to an agenda set in large
part by criminological concerns, and with reference to objects (e.g.
ears, tattoos) and tools (again, calliper and camera) that were of
shared currency. Little wonder that Lombroso welcomed Bertillion
as a fellow traveller. Fingerprinting was an equally hybrid product:
in its modern incarnation it emerged from within an imperial judi-
cial apparatus focused on containing native ‘criminal castes’. For
many of its most inﬂuential early proponents ﬁngerprints linked
to this project by serving not as marks of individual differentiation
but as markers of racial, ethnic and characterological groupings.
The fact that this latter version of ﬁngerprinting is now largely for-
gotten is, for Cole, the outcome of a concerted effort on the part of
subsequent ﬁngerprint examiners, who were seeking to establish
themselves as experts worthy of trust, to disassociate themselves
from speculative over-reaching: ‘By turning the ﬁngerprint into
an empty signiﬁer—a sign devoid of information about a body’s
race, ethnicity, heredity, character, or criminal propensity—ﬁnger-
print examiners made ﬁngerprint identiﬁcation seem less value-la-
den, more factual.’4
The ‘selective amnesia’5 that enabled ﬁngerprinting, by erasing
its criminological twin, to emerge as a straightforward tool of crim-
inalistics, also operates in the other direction: that is, the interpre-
tive allure of the (ultimately dead-end) problematic of ‘criminal
types’ has worked against an appreciation of the range of contempo-
raneously developing criminalistic practices that extended beyond
those associated with the problem of individuation. Breaking this
latter historiographical stranglehold offers a new perspective on
the history of forensics.
Our choice of historical case study to accomplish this might ap-
pear an unlikely one, as Gross and his Handbook have gone largely
unnoticed by historians. By contrast, practitioner accounts of the
rise of forensic science in general, and of scientiﬁc approaches to3 Sekula (1986), p. 19. ‘‘‘Criminology’’, in his succinct phrasing, ‘hunted ‘‘the’’ criminal b
4 Cole (2001), p. 100.
5 Ibid.
6 Chisum and Turvey (2011), pp. 30, 32.
7 For biographical details, see Bachhiesl (2010), Becker (2004), Grassberger (1956).
8 Gross, 1911 (1898 orig.). For a critical assessment of Gross’ historiographic treatment
9 As Becker points out, however, the German term ‘Kriminalistik’ refers to the broad ﬁeld
than the one we are adopting for its English counterpart. Becker (2001), p. 199.criminal investigation and policing in particular, routinely pay trib-
ute to its status as a formative text. Its publication was a ‘wa-
tershed event’ according to a recent assessment, ‘the ﬁrst
comprehensive textbook to systematically cover the integrated
philosophy and practice of scientiﬁc criminal investigation, foren-
sic analysis, and crime reconstruction. Its philosophies have not
been diminished by the passage of time and should be required
study for any student of these subjects.’6
Celebratory assessments in the practitioner literature come as
no surprise, for they respond to the elements of the Grossian re-
gime that have become routinised in contemporary crime scene
investigation (hereinafter CSI): the identiﬁcation and preservation
of trace evidence, the avoidance of scene contamination, chains of
custody, and the interface between the ﬁeld and the laboratory,
amongst many others. In our analysis we will attend to facets of
this recognisably ‘modern’ Gross. But we will also give detailed
consideration to a key feature of his handbook that does not so eas-
ily map onto present-day expectations: the multilayered, synoptic
role assigned to the investigative enterprise’s central character: its
eponymous untersuchungsrichter (Examining Magistrate, or,
following the English translations, Investigating Ofﬁcer). To be
sure, this can in part be explained by reference to organisational
differences of forensic culture: Gross’ Investigating Ofﬁcer (herein-
after IO), a judicial ofﬁcial charged with overseeing, co-ordinating,
and personally conducting investigations into criminal cases, does
not have an equivalent in the Anglo-American world of CSI. This
difference in function for our present purposes is of marginal inter-
est. However, it does engender the feature of Gross’ text that is a
core concern: its provision of a detailed, and strikingly self-reﬂex-
ive, account of the physical, physiological and psychological con-
siderations that underpin—and equally threaten to undermine—
even the most ostensibly simple act of crime scene perception.
Attention to the way in which Gross constitutes his IO as a reli-
able observer and manager of hidden crime scene traces is crucial
to our dual objective of historicising the crime scene and thereby en-
abling criminalistics to emerge from the under shadow of criminol-
ogy. We should here acknowledge that this involves a degree of
selective attention. Like Bertillion and Galton, historically and
historiographically, Gross occupies a hybrid position between crim-
inologyand criminalistics. His allegiances to the former are formida-
ble: as professor of criminal law at the Universities of Czernowitz
(1897-1902), Prague (1902-1905) and Graz (1905-1915), he was
deeply engaged in contemporary debates on criminality as an
anthropological and psychological phenomenon.7 In 1898 he pub-
lished his inﬂuential Criminal Psychology, which despite its systematic
critique of Lombroso’s empirical failings and its championing of psy-
chologically-driven research into perception andmemory as an alter-
native to the dominance of criminal anthropology, still workedwithin
a broadly degenerationist framework.8 In the same year he founded
the journal Archiv für Kriminalanthropologie und Kriminalistik
(Archives for Criminal Anthropology and Criminalistics), which over
the course of his nearly twenty years as editor in chief developed an
international reputationas anoutlet for advanced research in theﬁeld.
As the title of his journal suggests, however, there is different
side to Gross: not the author of Criminal Psychology but of Criminal
Investigation, published ﬁve years earlier.9 The genealogy of this
book is linked to his work as a professional crime ﬁghter thatody. Criminalistics hunted ‘‘this’’ or ‘‘that’’ criminal body.’ (p. 18).
as a Lombrosian acolyte, see Vyleta (2006).
of professions engaged in matters of criminal law, and thus has a more generic usage
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his home town of Graz in 1870, Gross was appointed as an IO for
Upper Styria. It was in this capacity that he accrued two decades
worth of practical experience of engaging in the investigation of spe-
ciﬁc crimes and the pursuit of their perpetrators. In a series of arti-
cles the historian Peter Becker has provided a valuable
contextualising framework for this version of Gross, one that helps
us to locate our analysis of Grossian CSI within a set of disciplinary
and practical trends in continental criminology.10 Becker places
Gross as part of a generation of German-speaking police and law
reformers in the second half of the nineteenth century whose main
aim was to set the modern investigation and prosecution of crime
on a standardised, objective footing. They attempted this in large
part by modelling their practices on the contemporary physical
and natural sciences, whose characteristics Becker derives in large
measure from Daston and Galison’s classic work on the interlaced
cognitive, technical and emotional disciplines associated with an
emergent regime of ‘mechanical objectivity’.11
Our understanding of Gross largely supports Becker’s analysis,
in that we see Gross’ attempt to present a system for criminal
investigation as a composite of individual affect, gesture and per-
ception, and networked bureaucratic routine. We differ, however,
in our selection of the site at which to observe and analyse this
set of practices. Becker’s principal interest lies in the way that this
reformed regime engages with its human quarry—the bodies, mind
and ‘lifeworlds’ of criminals themselves. Thus, for instance, he
argues that the standardisation of methods of criminalistic obser-
vation, ranging from physiognomic description to the photographic
capture of criminal types, lent the legitimising aura of the physical
and natural sciences to the control and surveillance of criminal
deviance.12
By contrast, in what follows we use Gross to articulate a crimi-
nalistic-centred history of forensics. We do this fully aware of his
criminological side, which is in plain view in Criminal Investigation:
chapters devoted to criminal slang and superstition, the habits of
‘wandering tribes’, and other staples of criminal anthropology
and psychology occupy roughly one-ﬁfth of the text. In addition,
even in the sections devoted to the IO’s crime scene activities,
the discussion of traces (much like Bertillon’s treatment of ears)
can take on a dual signiﬁcance. Excrement left at crime scenes, to
take a particularly striking example, has at the same time an
anthropological dimension (a superstitious practice of certain
criminal ‘tribes’) and one relevant to crime scene analysis: excre-
ment can be examined for its constitutive physical traces (seeds,
parasites, e.g.) that may link it to its human source.13 It is to this
latter version of crime scene trace—and to the conditions for its
effective investigation—that our discussion now turns.
2. Preparing the investigator: Gross and the psycho-physiology
of perception
The ﬁrst line of Gross’ Handbook makes its author’s objective
crystal clear: ‘The aim of this book is to be as practical as possible.’
Neither a law book nor a traditional work of medical jurisprudence,10 Becker (2001, 2004, 2005, 2006).
11 Daston and Galison (1992, 2007).
12 Though Becker does suggest that the objectifying trajectory he is examining with respe
his principal interest, and thus he does not attempt to engage it systematically. The clos
traditional criminological and innovative criminalistic elements of Gross’ Handbook. Becke
though by displacing the criminological Gross to a greater degree we are able to provide
13 Gross (1906, 1893 orig.), pp. 193–194, 383–384. This hybrid quality of Gross’ text has
both an object of bio-chemical and anthropological analysis), and by Becker (2004), with re
example.
14 Gross (1906), p. xxi.
15 Ibid., p. xxvi.
16 Ibid.Gross continues, it is instead a manual of instruction ‘for all those
engaged in investigating crime’.14 Yet its sheer scale—which in the
ﬁrst English edition ran to over 900 pages culminating in a ‘selected
list of authorities’ comprised of more than 1000 entries—signals that
this was no straightforward set of common-sense guidelines. For
Gross, ‘practical’ action, effectively executed, was anything but
straightforward. An individual’s most basic perceptual and cognitive
actions were deeply mediated, and these levels of mediation, and
their potential to mislead, needed to be systematically analysed in
order for effective criminal investigation to take place.
Still in the introduction, Gross begins to unpack this world of
complex mediation. He starts with what at ﬁrst glance looks like
a secure and in his day an increasingly commonplace opposition:
between the testimony of human witnesses, and the testimony
of physical things. Human testimony, even that of the most well-
intentioned witness, is in his view ‘much over-rated’, because it
is subject to a myriad of distorting inﬂuences—the physical and
emotional status of the witness or the physical conditions that
frame an event, for example. He then, and again at ﬁrst glance
entirely conventionally, turns to the comparative value of material
(in his words ‘realistic’) proof:
The trace of a crime discovered and turned to good account, a
correct sketch be it ever so simple, a microscopic slide, a deci-
phered correspondence, a photograph of a person or object, a
tattooing, a restored piece of burnt paper, a careful survey, a
thousand more material things are all examples of incorrupt-
ible, disinterested, and enduring testimony from which mis-
taken, inaccurate, and biassed perceptions, as well as evil
intention, perjury, and unlawful co-operation, are excluded.15
So far, so simple. But Gross’ more challenging notion of the
‘practical’—into which the reader will soon be drawn—is signalled
by the immediately preceding sentence: if psychology teaches us
to be attentive to the sources of distortion in human testimony,
he wrote, ‘so the other parts of the subject show us the value of
facts, where they can be obtained, how they can be held fast and
appraised—these things are just as important as to show what
can be done with the facts when obtained.’16 In other words, the
identiﬁcation, retention and evaluation of physical evidence are acts
of perception and cognition that equally require self-scrutiny to be
effective. It is important to note at the outset, then, that Gross’ text
does not operate on a pre-established privileging of things over hu-
mans (though it does operationalise this as a legitimate hierarchy
once properly justiﬁed). Instead, it is treated as the outcome of a
way of seeing and acting that creates the conditions for things being
able to speak for themselves.
In the context of criminal investigation, the lynchpin of ‘incor-
ruptible, disinterested, and enduring testimony’ is the IO, and thus
it comes as no surprise that the ﬁrst part of the Handbook is en-
tirely devoted to sketching out this crucial ﬁgure. His heroic
general attributes (possession of ‘the vigour of youth, energy ever
on the alert, robust health . . . liveliness and vigilance’) are supple-
mented by a formidable intellectual capacity, an ability ‘to solve
problems relating to every conceivable branch of humanct to criminals had an analogue in the materiality of criminal investigation, this is not
est convergence between Becker and ourselves comes in his article juxtaposing the
r’s observations on this latter version of Gross resonate with elements of our analysis,
a fuller analysis of Grossian CSI. Becker (2004).
been noted by Christian Bachhiesl (2010) with respect to crime scene blood traces (as
spect to footprints (as measureable physical trace and characterological indicator), for
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why boilers explode, how to read account books, understanding
slang and decoding ciphers).17 In outlining these essential charac-
teristics Gross emphasises their broad and practically engaged nat-
ure—anything and everything may be of use in his line of work, so
from the moment of taking up the role the IO becomes a student
of the world and everything in it. Importantly, this omnivorous atti-
tude is an on-going matter of disposition enacted prior to any spe-
ciﬁc investigative engagement: ‘He who seeks to learn only when
some notable crime turns up’, Gross warns, ‘will have great difﬁculty
in learning anything at all. His knowledge should be acquired before-
hand by constant application in his ordinary life. Every day, nay
every moment’, he continues,
he must be picking up something in touch with his work. Thus
the zealous Investigating Ofﬁcer will note on his walks the foot-
prints found on the dust of the highway; he will observe the
tracks of animals, of the wheels of carriages, the marks of
pressure on the grass where someone has sat or lain down, or
perhaps deposited a burden. He will examine little pieces of
paper that have been thrown away, marks or injuries on trees,
displaced stones, broken glass or pottery, doors and windows
open or shut in an unusual manner. Everything will afford an
opportunity for drawing conclusions and explaining what must
have previously taken place.18
By engaging in this practical observation and the causal inferences
that ordinary phenomena suggest to the attentive observer, the IO
trains for the moment when these background skills are called upon
in the face of the extraordinary—the scene of a crime.
Throughout this discussion the theme of ‘preparation’ recurs.
Cognitive preparation is accompanied by a physical and spatial
one, through which the IO embeds himself within a known context
from which information and resources, once required, can be read-
ily called upon. Thus, in his everyday ramblings he will have as
ever-present companions instruments (e.g. an ordnance survey, a
watch, a compass) enabling him to establish objective coordinates
such as relative distance and travel time between ﬁxed points. In-
deed, Gross includes a named subsection on ‘orientation’, in which
he instructs the IO on methods for assembling in advance his ‘base
of operations’—including a network of subordinates and auxiliaries
(from police ofﬁcers and grave-diggers to local medical men and
university-based experts) on whom he could draw with conﬁdence
in the event of an occurrence requiring investigation.
There are obvious practical dimensions to this preparatory atti-
tude, but underneath it lurks a constant theme: preparation aids
the IO to be an effective observer by helping shield him from the
vicissitudes of perceptual and cognitive error. In this way, Gross
presents the translation of the place in which a crime occurred into
a ‘crime scene’ as dependent on, and interactive with, a prior set of
labours undertaken by his IO. The crime scene and IO are co-exten-
sive products, called into being by the thoroughness of Gross’ prac-
tical advice, and dependent not merely on material requirements
but their human correlatives as well.17 Ibid., p. 1.
18 Ibid., pp. 2, 3. This feature of Gross’ text is also discussed in Becker (2004).
19 For a nuanced historical account of ﬁn-de-siècle legal and scientiﬁc discussions on the
20 Gross’ engagement with the psychology of perception provides an opportunity to note a
Criminal Psychology he makes the following observation: ‘‘‘Every state of consciousness has i
problem. Every mental event must have its corresponding physical event in some form, an
(1911), p. 41. Here Gross is urging the investigation of unconscious and involuntary physi
But in doing so he also establishes a striking parallel between the mind (as a repository o
world), and the crime scene (as a space for the retrieval of another set of signiﬁcant physi
21 Here we diverge from Becker’s analysis, which notes the engagement of Gross and his
but which then dismisses it as a half-hearted, largely rhetorical exercise. The reason he gi
classiﬁcation and reconstruction of human behaviour’—which would not bear the scrutiny o
analysis, the reverse is the case: Gross’ engagement is direct, detailed, and integral to his
22 Gross (1906), pp. 5, 14-5.Attention to this interplay between observer and observed,
investigator and material trace, results in a collapsing in his text
of the ostensibly straightforward opposition mentioned above be-
tween the testimony of things and of human beings, an opposition
that ﬁgures both in the writings of Gross’ contemporaries and in
modern histories of ﬁn-de-siècle forensics.19 The point of departure
for both is the signiﬁcance attributed to research into the psycho-
physiology of perception from the mid nineteenth century, initially
in the German laboratories of investigators like Hermann von Helm-
holtz and Carl Ludwig and then by a second generation of research-
ers, most notably Hugo Munsterberg in the U.S. The core insight of
this work—that the dynamics of memory, cognition, experience
and the like may lead even the most honest human witness to pro-
vide false testimony—had two linked results. First, it led to the rec-
ognition that everyone involved in the investigation and prosecution
of crime needed to be aware of the causes and implications of wit-
ness perceptual fallibility, and to adjust their strategies for eliciting
and interpreting witness statements accordingly. Second, commen-
tators elevated material over human testimony, seeking out ‘mute
witnesses’ wherever possible to short-circuit the evident dangers
of relying on the human alternative.20
But in developing his manual Gross added a complication to this
simple reversal in the evidentiary hierarchy: yes, the IO needed to
be instructed in the vicissitudes of human testimony; and yes,
physical evidence was invaluable and often more reliable than its
human counterpart. Yet making matter testify accurately was itself
a complex task fraught with possibilities for error. This is because
research into the contingencies of cognition and perception ap-
plied as much to the IO as to any other testiﬁer. For the crime scene
to speak in a secure language of material fact, in other words, its
interlocutor needed to be prepared in advance to receive and
appreciate its meaning. It is in this sense that the Grossian vision
of CSI entails interdependent human and material work. The proto-
cols of CSI that at ﬁrst glance appear to merely secure the material
objects at the scene (the careful delineation of a space of investiga-
tion, the physical restraint in approaching and handling objects in
that space, the meticulous graphic recording of those objects in
their spatial and temporal dimensions) at the same time serve to
secure the IO as a reliable harvester of trace evidence.21
This background work prepares the IO to confront, and conquer,
what Gross identiﬁes as ‘the most deadly enemy of all inquiries’—
preconceived theories. These, Gross advises his reader, will be
shown throughout the volume to be numerous in origin, astonish-
ingly easy to take root, and exceptionally difﬁcult to extirpate.22 As
a rule, preconceived theories result from examining an issue ‘from a
false point of view’. This can happen, Gross explains, for physical rea-
sons—objects can appear different from what they really are, for
example, either by virtue of a faulty sensory apparatus (e.g. physical
pressure on the eyeball) or by the conditions in which the perception
took place. To illustrate this latter point Gross invokes the effects
created by observations in a humid atmosphere. Through water
charged air, mountains appear closer than they really are, an effect
for which he rejects the term ‘illusion’ because it conforms to knownrelative value of human and material testimony, see Golan (2006), chapter 6.
suggestive link between his conceptualisation of mental and physical investigation. In
ts physical correlate,’’ says Helmholtz, and this proposition contains the all in all of our
d is therefore capable of being sensed, or known to be indicated by some trace.’ Gross
cal behaviour—e.g. reﬂex responses, nervous laughter—to unmask deceitful criminals.
f retrievable, physical evidentiary traces created by its engagement with the external
cal traces).
ilk with the contemporary literature on the psychology and physiology of perception,
ves for this assessment is the essentially criminological nature of their interests—‘the
f a scientiﬁcally rigorous account of the preconditions for objective perception. In our
overall project. Becker (2001), esp. pp. 227–228.
20 I. Burney, N. Pemberton / Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (2013) 16–25physical laws. The same applies to the classic example of the osten-
sibly bent stick halfway submerged in a glass of water. Here again,
Gross insists, the fact that the stick appears bent is not itself an illu-
sion—it is only when someone, ignorant of the principles of optics,
thinks that the stick is in reality bent, that accurate observation is
threatened.23
But there were more subtle, and dangerous, ‘moral’ sources of
error. By way of illustration Gross offers a hypothetical case in
which an IO is informed of a case of arson in a distant locality:
immediately in spite of one’s self the scene is imagined; for
example, one pictures the house, which one has never seen, as
being on the left-hand side of the road. As the information is
received at headquarters the idea formed about the scene
becomes precise and ﬁxed. In imagination the whole scene
and its secondary details are presented, but everything is
always placed on the left of the road; this idea ends by taking
such a hold on the mind that one is convinced that the house
is on the left, and all questions are asked as if one had seen
the house in that position. But suppose the house to be really
on the right of the road and that by chance the error is never
rectiﬁed; suppose further that the situation of the house
has some importance for the bringing out of the facts or in
forming a theory of the crime, then this false idea may, in
spite of its apparent insigniﬁcance, considerably confuse the
investigation.24
At its root, Gross continues, this error of the imagination follows
from a ‘psychical imperfection’ inherent to humans, who at a gen-
eral level are interpreters rather than recorders, interpreters who
bring their own predispositions to bear on any given act of observa-
tion. They tend to complete stories, to ﬁll in gaps (perceptual and/or
cognitive) with a bank of pre-stored data that supplement what is
registered via direct experience.
There are several consequences to this, none more important
than the ordinary observer’s penchant for noticing, and prioritising,
that which appears striking and vivid:
it is only in conformity with human nature to stop the more
willingly at what is more interesting than at what belongs to
everyday life. We like to discover romantic features where they
do not exist and we even prefer the recital of monstrosities and
horrors to that of common every-day facts. This is implanted in
the nature of every one, and though in some to a greater, in
some to a lesser extent, still there it is. A hundred proofs, exem-
pliﬁed by what we read most, by what we listen to most will-
ingly, by what sort of news spreads the fastest, show that the
majority of men have received at birth a tendency to
exaggeration.25
In itself, Gross observes, this is no great evil—indeed, it is the well-
spring of the creative imagination. But the IO ought, by deﬁnition, to
be a class apart: ‘in the profession of the criminal expert everything
bearing the least trace of exaggeration must be removed in the most
energetic and conscientious manner; otherwise, the Investigating
Ofﬁcer will become an expert unworthy of his service and even dan-
gerous to humanity.’26 Here the IO’s background habituation to
noticing the ordinary comes into its own—he knows that what ap-
pears the most striking is not necessarily the most signiﬁcant. But
adhering to this attitude requires constant work: ‘The only remedy23 Ibid., p. 64.
24 Ibid., p. 16.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 17.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 123.is to watch oneself most carefully, always work with reﬂection,
and prune out everything having the least suspicion of exaggera-
tion.’27 In other words, the IO’s acts of perception are subject to
the same sources of error as those of any other witness. Information
given to or unearthed by him is registered through his own percep-
tual apparatus, and is thus subject to the very distortions that threa-
ten any product of the act of witnessing. As a necessary consequence,
the ostensible objectivity of material traces is an outcome, rather
than a prior condition, of the procedures Gross is delineating.
This outcome ultimately depends on the IO’s ‘submission to se-
vere discipline’, one that comes into its own at the crime scene.28 It
is to this novel space that we now turn. It is important to emphasise
that in doing so our aim is to both describe the making of the crime
scene and to show how its constitutive elements (its gestures, sensi-
bilities, routines of investigation, recording and preserving) reinforce
Gross’ characterisation of the IO that we have just outlined. The
instructions he provides on the proper way of effecting CSI thus
serve a double function: on the one hand they can be considered
generic (at times banal) homilies on the importance of investigative
care. But the constant self-monitoring is also essential to the physi-
cal and cognitive practice of CSI. In other words, his engagement
with the problems of perception that we’ve sketched above are a log-
ical and operational prerequisite for the crime scene’s epistemic sta-
tus as a ﬁeld of latent, objective material traces that can be utilised
as such for the purposes of investigation. The crime scene as a space
of hidden but objectively apprehendable traces, therefore, is not
merely the site for the deployment of a highly structured way of see-
ing, but is in fact produced by it.
3. CSI: Suspending space and time
Gross’ preliminary strictures on the dynamics of perception, the
mediations of the imagination and the need for submission to
forms of physical and cognitive discipline are all put into action
in the subsequent sections of the Handbook. The ﬁrst of these fo-
cuses on witness testimony, in which he provides a comprehensive
outline of what the IO needs to consider when gathering and eval-
uating evidence based on human perception other than his own.
But it is his next section, ‘Inspection of Localities’, that most inter-
ests us, for it is here that Gross at once calls into being a new
space—the crime scene—and aligns his earlier observations to it
as a necessary precondition for its successful management.
There are several interlocking elements of Grossian CSI that we
will outline generally, and then subject to further critical scrutiny.
First, the crime scene is a space of record: the IO’s report, Gross
stipulates in the opening line of this discussion, ‘is a real touch-
stone’.29 Second, despite its often alarming elements (e.g. blood,
corpses), the crime scene is a space of emotional and physical equi-
librium. Third, it is a space of mental and gestural restraint: men-
tally, it has no place for preconceptions as to what transpired
within it, which of its material traces are signiﬁcant, or what they
might signify; gesturally, it demands suspension of any impulse to
engage (and thus potentially disturb) that which appears to be of
interest and value. As he develops these three virtues of CSI, they
interlace to simultaneously construct a space of investigation and
align its investigator to it, and in so doing call into play the prepara-
tions and self-understanding that has gone into the making of a
Grossian IO.
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fence’ capture the essential relationship between investigative
space and investigator affect: ‘On arrival at the scene of the crime
certain things must be attended to which are common to all cases,
be they of simple theft, robbery, murder, arson, or misdemeanour.
The ﬁrst duty is to preserve an absolute calm. With it everything is
won, without it everything is compromised.’ This calm serves sev-
eral functions. First, it enables the IO to efﬁciently activate his net-
work of auxiliaries, thereby preserving a key feature of his prior
orienting labour:
An Investigating Ofﬁcer who fusses about, sets to work aim-
lessly, starts a plan only to drop it, asks everybody useless ques-
tions, and gives orders only to cancel them, makes a most
painful impression on those engaged with him in the inquiry
and destroys any conﬁdence they may have had in his success-
ful management. . . . But if the Investigating Ofﬁcer shows per-
fect conﬁdence with no trace of excitement, and acts as with
a sure prevision of the results, everyone willingly submits to
his orders and each does his very best and the result of the
enquiry is assured.30
Calm also affords the IO with an initial opportunity for self-scrutiny.
Echoing his earlier discussion of the tendency to project and ﬁx an
image of phenomena in advance, Gross warns that the very act of
being called to the scene itself represents a possible layer of
mediation:
As soon as the Investigating Ofﬁcer is informed about a case it
absorbs all his thoughts . . . [H]e immediately makes a mental
picture of the case itself and all connected with it, in a deﬁnite
form, with precise outlines; when travelling to the spot he bases
upon this idea his conjectures as to how the offence has been
committed, and builds, upon his mental picture of the spot,
the plan of inquiry to be pursued. The idea may take root in
his mind to such an extent that he cannot rid himself of it either
in part or in whole even when the scene is actually displayed
before his eyes. . .
Calm at the start of his physical engagement with the scene enables
a realignment of these preconceptions—or, in Gross’ words, to ‘ﬁnd
his bearings’.31
Having thus oriented himself, the IO is ready to shift from back-
ground to foreground work, but again this work is informed by his
prior submission to Grossian rigour. His ﬁrst task is to secure the
crime scene by ﬁxing it as a spatio-temporal entity: ‘The exclusion
of everything happening after the moment when the crime was
committed’, he explained, ‘is a very special task for the Investigat-
ing Ofﬁcer’. This had several components that have since become
CSI staples: marking off a perimeter zone to prevent unauthorised
access, and shielding ‘vestiges of the crime’ within it from contact
with forces that might degrade or contaminate them, for
example.32 In doing this the IO enacts his suspension of ordinary
standards of distinguishing between, and reacting to, what seems
noteworthy and what trivial:30 Ibid., p. 126.
31 Ibid., pp. 126,127.
32 Ibid., p. 128.
33 Ibid., p. 130.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., p. 130. The eschewal of conventional expectation equally informs the IO’s approac
importance if the attention be conﬁned to safes, almirahs, beds, boxes, stoves, or chimneys
important objects cannot be hidden.’ Ibid., p. 163. Similarly, the IO’s report needed to
evidentiary ﬁnds but also their absence: ‘The notiﬁcation of even purely negative facts shoul
other reassure the reader and show him that they were not forgotten altogether.’ Ibid., p.
36 Ibid., p. 130. Emphasis original.
37 Ibid., pp. 196,197.everything may be of importance and nothing too small or
insigniﬁcant to have a decisive bearing upon the case. The situ-
ation of an object an inch or two to left or right, to front or back,
a little dust, a splash of dirt easy to efface, may all turn out to be
of the ﬁrst importance.33
This realisation enforces a set of gestural disciplines which
secures the crime scene as a space of latent meaning, meaning
inherent, moreover, not merely in the things lying within it but,
crucially, in their relationship to one another. The crime scene thus
requires protection against the ‘natural impulse’ of those who
engage it, that is,
to immediately touch any object of apparent signiﬁcance, as
e.g., an object left on the scene of the crime by the criminal. It
is laid hold of and moved about, and only afterwards is it recog-
nised that the object in itself signiﬁes very little but that every-
thing depends on its position–which can no longer be ﬁxed.34
Gross illustrates this with an appropriately striking example, one
that underscores his concern to contain the destabilising effects of
the emotive dynamics of perception and cognition. When con-
fronted with a murder victim, he writes, the ‘involuntary impulse’
is to seize the hands and search them for signs of a struggle (hair,
torn clothing, e.g.). But by thus indulging the desire to assemble
narrative out of obviously compelling elements, the undisciplined
IO sacriﬁces a world of more subtle clues and thus projects himself
into the crime scene not as its protector but as a prime source of
degradation and contamination.35
By contrast, his Grossian counterpart follows his mentor’s ‘gold-
en and inviolable rule’: ‘Never alter the position of, pick up, or even
touch any object before it has been minutely described in the report.’36
This dictum draws attention to the central place of recording in CSI.
First, it showcases the critical importance of the crime scene report
as a means of capturing (however ﬂeetingly) a moment in time and
space, a moment that, despite the IO’s best efforts, can only ever be
temporarily achieved.
Gross lavishes elaborate (and tedious) detail on how to record
in order to preserve, and suggests a series of aids to this end. In
the classic case of hair found clapsed in a murder victim’s lifeless
hand, he provides an ‘intentionally primitive’ series of drawings
for registering spatial and relational details—e.g. the direction of
the hair root—that went beyond the mere fact of presence.37 (see
Fig 1) Elsewhere he furnishes more sophisticated instruction, insist-
ing on conformity to a ‘technical formula’ and the utilisation of
objective reference points secured instrumentally (compass points,
spirit level readings, plumb-line angles). Thus, for example, in
sketching a room in which a murder had been committed, Gross in-
structs the IO as follows:
the door should be taken as a starting point and the same direc-
tion followed as the hands of a clock, i.e., standing in the
entrance and facing into the room, start from the left hand
and go round the room towards the right hand; in this way
one will be certain that nothing has been forgotten. Firsth to the search for evidentiary traces. ‘There is little probability of ﬁnding anything of
’, Gross warns. ‘Absolutely everything must be examined, for there is no place where
suspend common narrative standards of interest by including not merely positive
d not be neglected, for on the one hand they may lead to positive inferences and on the
132. Emphasis original.
Fig. 1. (Gross 1906), p. 196.
Fig. 2. (Gross, 1906), p. 468.
22 I. Burney, N. Pemberton / Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (2013) 16–25describe the size, shape, height, and other peculiarities of the
space in question. Then go from the entrance towards the near-
est left corner, then the left-hand wall, then the wall facing the
entrance, then the right-hand wall, then the remainder of
the wall to the right of the doorway, and ﬁnally the objects in
the middle of the room. In the course of this description the
windows and the doors will be noticed. Next describe any alter-
ations in the state of the moveables in the room consequent
upon the crime in question, damage done by blows, bloodstains,
changes in the situation or position of objects, damage to win-
dows, doors, etc; and ﬁnally a minute description of the subject-
matter of the crime (e.g., a broken safe, a dead body, etc.) with
all the particulars necessary to a detailed description.38
A later chapter on drawing (as one of the IO’s ‘special crafts’), pro-
vides still further detailed instruction on how to secure objective
‘orientation’ in crime scene sketches, advising the re-plotting of
the physical space of the crime scene onto squared paper, and the
reproduction in the paper’s squared units of ‘everything that may
be seen in nature in the large squares’. Gross illustrates this (see
Fig 2) with the following explanation:
Suppose that a certainnumberof dropsof bloodwhichhavedried
upon a plank have to be depicted. The large sketch represents the
actual subject-matter and the small one the ﬁnished drawing.
First examine the portion of the plank to be drawn and its dimen-
sions. This is then delimited by means of a set-square, setting
down the lines A A’ & I I’ at right angles. These are then divided
into a certain number of equal parts, the more there are of them
the more accurate the result will be; parallels are then drawn so
as to obtain a certain number of squares of equal size.39
These instructions at once reinforce and encode in practice Gross’
general strictures against rushing to examine what initially strikes
the IO as the most interesting, or signiﬁcant, element of the scene.
Translating the natural space of the crime scene onto a paper grid
effects a regime of total recording: it is only at the end of an
exhaustive description of the scene as a whole that crime’s
‘subject-matter’ is considered. The investigator who systematically
records rather than touches thus secures the crime scene for future38 Ibid., p. 132,133.
39 Ibid., p. 468. Gross’ graphic approach has afﬁnities with those being developed in contem
century archaeological manuals away from artefact-based illustration to graphic representa
discussion of the introduction of the quadrat into ecological surveys is also relevant: the qua
human tendency to focus on (and thus to over-estimate the numbers of) ‘attractive’ plant
40 In this sense it again echoes developments in contemporaneous ﬁeld sciences, most n
irrespective of any prior hierarchy of value assigned to the objects that lay within any ﬁ
operationalising of the early twentieth-century crime scene. Burney (2013).analysis at a distance in time and space. But in addition he con-
ﬁrms his physical and cognitive self restraint, his capacity to defer
engagement with the world of immediate appearance in order to
preserve one of as yet unseen, fragile traces and inter-relation-
ships. It is this set of practices that instantiates a modern regime
of CSI, with its imperatives of preservation of matter in time and
space, of guarding against physical and conceptual contamination,
of guaranteeing the future use value of harvested material through
routine gestures. Crime scene recording, then, is at once the out-
come of investigative discipline and its guarantor.40poraneous ﬁeld sciences. Gavin Lucas, for example, notes the shift in late nineteenth-
tions of the site as a space of systematic excavation and investigation. Robert Kolher’s
drat similarly functioned as a means of disciplining the surveyor by circumventing the
s. Lucas (2001), pp. 23,24, Kohler (2002), chapter 4, esp. pp. 100–108.
otably archaeology, which emphasised the need for producing a total record of a site
eld. As discussed elsewhere, this sensibility is critical to the conceptualisation and
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gaze that anchors this web of practices, we can take this set of fun-
damental gestures as providing a further means of ‘orienting’ the
IO. The very act of minute recording ‘with scrupulous exactitude
the description of how everything is found on the spot’ produces
an observational attitude prepared to detect minor ‘errors’ or dis-
continuities in a scene of ostensibly conventional appearances:
So long as one only looks on the scene, it is impossible, what-
ever be the care, time, and attention bestowed, to detect all
the details, and especially to note various incongruities: but
these strike us at once when we set ourselves to describe the
picture on paper as exactly and clearly as possible.41
To develop this point Gross turns to a technique he attributes to
painters, in which they seek out ﬂaws in their compositions by
looking at them in a mirror, which induces visual estrangement
from a scene that they have grown accustomed to viewing from a
single perspective. By recourse to such an inverted image of their
work, ‘defects in a drawing are most easily and surely detected’.42
In CSI, scrupulous recording serves an analogous function: ‘the
exact description of the surroundings is so to speak the mirror in
which all ‘‘defects of the situation’’ are reﬂected.’43 Defects, again,
derive from perceptual distortion caused by preconception—from
being habituated to one way of seeing, or indeed by imposing one’s
own narrative expectations or assumptions. Such impositions, Gross
explains, will produce contradictions (‘defects of the situation’)
which remain invisible to the perceiver unless some mechanism of
estrangement intervenes. Indeed, this ﬁxed (and ultimately ﬂawed)
conventionalised way of seeing abets the perceiver’s distorting de-
sire for an explanatory account of what is before him. It takes effort
to disrupt this tendency, to dislodge the human tendency to see
within a conventionalised frame of meaning. It is the mirror that
makes these discontinuities—between what a viewer sees through
eyes that seek simple explanation of what is seen and the more com-
plex realities of what is actually there—evident to those who submit
to its discipline: ‘the ‘‘defects of the situation’’’, Gross explains, ‘are
just those contradictions, those improbabilities, which occur when one
desires to represent the situation as something quite different from what
it really is’.44
Gross makes a similar point when earlier in his text he invokes
the practices of the copy-editor whose ability to detect textual er-
rors depends on his suspension of conventionalised reading habits.
When we read, he observes, we do not notice every letter, but take
in the whole word as a general ‘shape’ that conforms to a prior
bank of comparative forms. As a consequence, we constantly fail
to notice minor printer’s errors, especially if the word is long and
the mistake does not markedly modify its appearance.
Something analogous occurs in all perceptions and more fre-
quently than we ordinarily suppose: what enables us to seize
more easily the aspect of a whole is that we seek and store up
in our memory certain characteristic features from which we
can immediately spot the object.45
In his reading of the crime scene, the IO similarly requires an eye
that resists the embrace of conventionalised meaning and instead41 Gross (1906), p. 642.
42 Ibid., p. 643.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. Emphasis original.
45 Ibid., p. 59.
46 The history of forensic photography has been dominated by accounts of Bertillon’s app
larger bureaucratic-statistical apparatus, which note the way in which the camera represen
identiﬁcation. See, e.g., Sekula (1986), Thomas (1999), and Tucker (2005). Less systematic a
crime scene photography, which was designed to situate persons and objects of evidence
space (depth, scale) and its contents. For suggestive insights, see Becker (2001), pp. 213–2
47 Gross (1906), p. 249.seeks out anomalies that identify the particularised ruptures to
which trace evidence alludes.
Gross’ routine CSI practices thus articulate with his founda-
tional observations about the conventionalised nature of percep-
tion, the tendency for observers, even with the ‘very best
intentions’, to view a scene through a prior bank of conceptions.
Minute recording and its allied physical and conceptual disciplines
conﬁrm the IO’s position as an actor apart: they simultaneously
preserve evidence in time and space, stabilise the IO’s emotional
register, and protect against the impulses and indeed the vision
stemming from an all too human tendency to engage at the level
of story.
4. Concluding thoughts: Historicising CSI
In this article we have examined the late nineteenth-century
origins of crime scene investigation as developed by Hans Gross.
In demonstrating the debt that our present-day criminalistics-
centred forensic culture owes to Gross and to the historical
moment in which he was embedded, we also wanted to raise a
related historiographical point about the value of repositioning
the history of forensic theory and practice outside of the parame-
ters of ﬁn-de-siècle criminology. Our analysis of his contribution
involved an appreciation of its engagement with late nineteenth-
century questions about perception and cognition as a complex
psycho-physiological process. Gross may well be an important
forbear of the gestures and sensibilities of modern CSI, but he is
also much more than that. His work provides a vantage point
from which to consider the historical contingencies of CSI and to
understand how the desire to overcome the ambiguities and
interpretative ﬂexibility inherent in human perception was, at
least for one its progenitors, a motivating force behind the pursuit
of a trace-centred forensics at the turn of the twentieth century.
By way of a conclusion, we want to reinforce our argument by
(brieﬂy) considering Gross’ discussion of the uses of photography
at the crime scene. Today, crime scene photography, with its ability
to create a permanent record of often evanescent objects and their
relation to one another at a fatefulmoment in time and space, is one
of CSI’s deﬁning tools.46 In certain respects, Gross’ views on the cam-
era’s crime scene role can be easily transposed onto our own modern
forensic expectations. He gives broad backing to the camera’s value at
the crime scene as a means of supplementing the IO’s quest for total
recording and preservation, citing with approval the forensic chemist
Paul Jerserich’s assertion that photography ‘is entirely objective and
always impartial; it is capable of ﬁxing certain details whichmay per-
haps be of subsequent importance and of which no one has dreamed
at the time of the inspection of localities.’47
However, and taking his lead from psychological and philosoph-
ical discussions about the nature of perception, Gross refused a
simple equation of photograph and truthful reproduction. He sig-
nals his interest in complicating this view in a footnote to the Jerse-
rich passage, which acknowledged the existence of a contemporary
debate about the epistemic status of photographic reproduction:
‘Concerning the objectivity and the apparent untruthfulness of
photography’, Gross remarked, ‘too much cannot be said. We mustlication of photography to criminal identiﬁcation and its role and integration into his
ted only one part of the archival practices underpinning his system of anthropometric
ttention has been paid to Bertillon’s extension of this methodology to his approach to
within a metric screen that preserved critical information about the contours of the
14, Valier (1998), pp. 96–100, and most recently Castro (2011).
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wrong impression’.48
What was also signiﬁcant about Gross’ set of observations on
photography was its dovetailing with his overall vision of CSI. First,
like the discipline of meticulous description, which enables the IO
to resist the seductions of conventionalised vision, crime scene
photography creates a perspectival space that enables reﬂection
and correction. Invoking again the example of the artist seeking
to escape habituated vision by recourse to a mirror image, Gross
proceeds to make a direct link:
In photography exactly the same may be said; an object has
been observed with great minuteness and application; a whole
series of observations have been made regarding it; nothing
striking has been noticed about it because one has become
accustomed to its appearance; but if it be photographed, the
new colour, the new situation, and the new aspect enable us
to see it from another point of view and reveal fresh details
which have not yet been discovered.49
In this sense the apparent ‘distortion’ inherent in photography be-
comes a resource for CSI, the photograph furnishing the IO with
an enabling ‘paradox’: it ‘shows us more than the eye, even when
it shows us no more than the eye can see.’50
The photographic image as a technically mediated product
holds out further possibilities for extending the vision of the IO.
In processing colour, for example, the photographic process ren-
ders reds and browns darker and clearer, and even makes them vis-
ible when a human eye cannot see them at all. This had
implications for certain types of forensic investigations—in exam-
ining a body for signs of bruising, for example, photography could
reveal ‘latent’ brown and red marks of potential evidentiary value:
‘Every pressure exercised on the skin of a man’, Gross explained,
‘results in the breaking or at least in the inﬂaming of the small
veins, and each time redness is produced. If the pressure has been
very feeble the redness will exist objectively but will not be dis-
cernible by the eye.’51
Turning to the apparent ‘inadequacies’ of photographs, Gross
identiﬁes and illustrates a fundamental difference between human
and mechanical vision. When a person places one hand in front of
the other so that it is closer to an observer sitting opposite, for
example, that observer will perceive the hands to be of equal size.
However, if the hands are photographed from the observer’s per-
spective, in the resulting photograph the hand nearest the camera
will appear larger than the other. This effect, he explained, captures
the physical reality of the situation as governed by optical laws.
However, in everyday practice our sense of visual realism is gov-
erned by different laws, ones drawn from everyday experience,
that inﬂuence observation and lead us to draw the opposite
conclusion:
We know the two hands are really of equal size and this knowl-
edge has so powerful an action that we see them of equal size
although, being in perspective, they ought to appear unequal.
On looking at the photograph of the hands, however, the princi-
ple of experience no longer acts with the same force; on the
contrary, we remember that what we are looking at is a picture
and attribute the fault to it and say it is an inaccurate reproduc-
tion, for we see upon the picture an exact reproduction from the
point of view of perspective and we notice an enormous differ-
ence in size, but it does not seem to agree with the reality.5248 Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 252.
50 Ibid., p. 251.
51 Ibid., p. 255.
52 Ibid., pp. 264,265.In photography, as in all matters of crime scene investigation, see-
ing effectively requires disciplined self-awareness that cannot be
achieved through mechanical means alone.
More broadly, as we have argued throughout, understanding
Gross’ remarkable attentiveness to the interrelated physical, per-
ceptual, cognitive and emotional dynamics that govern the IO’s la-
bours is critical to revealing how the crime scene emerged at the
turn of the twentieth century as its own epistemological space.
Engaging the Grossian project on its own terms enables an under-
standing of crime scene investigation as a historically and cultur-
ally variable set of practices. In so doing—by historicising the
processes and strategies through which early advocates like Gross
sought to establish the authority, legitimacy, and necessity of a
trace-driven mode of forensic investigation, we can also avoid
making determinist assumptions about its inevitability. Exploring
what its proponents wanted to achieve with CSI, and what they be-
lieved was required to put their vision into operation, opens up a
fresh pathway for pursuing forensics past, and present.
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